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INTRODUCTION
Unhealthy diets are contributing to alarming levels of obesity,
cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes, and certain cancers
throughout the United States.1 While high-fat, sugar- and sodiumladen diets are major contributors, one of the most important
causative factors is the increased consumption of sugary beverages,
which include beverages that contain added caloric sweeteners such
as flavored milks, fruit drinks, sports drinks, and sodas.2 Sugary
beverages are the single largest source of added sugar in the
American diet.3 Higher intake of sugary beverages among children
was associated with a fifty-five percent higher risk of being
overweight or obese than those with lower intake.4
Although federal and state governments have taken some
proactive measures to prevent diet-related diseases, local
governments have emerged as key innovators to promote healthier
diets.5 Innovative local measures include menu labeling laws, a soda
portion cap, soda taxes, and warning labels.6 These interventions
seek to discourage overconsumption of fats, sodium, and sugars,
which raises tensions between health promotion and the food and
beverage industry’s commercial interests in promoting products and

1. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF THE 2015 DIETARY GUIDELINES
ADVISORY COMMITTEE: ADVISORY REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES AND THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE 2 (2015).
2. See Kelly D. Brownell et al., The Public Health and Economic Benefits of
Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, NEW ENG. J. MED. 1599, 1599–1601 (2009).
3. Frank B. Hu, Resolved: There Is Sufficient Scientific Evidence That

Decreasing Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Consumption Will Reduce the Prevalence of
Obesity and Obesity-Related Diseases, 14 OBESITY REVS. 606, 606 (2013).
4. Id.
5. See Belinda Reeve et al., State and Municipal Innovations in Obesity Policy:
Why Localities Remain a Necessary Laboratory for Innovation, 105 AM. J. PUB.

HEALTH 442, 442–48 (2015).
6. See infra Section II.C.
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maximizing profits.7
Although cities are making progress to
encourage and promote healthier diets,8 these local governments
must prepare for the inevitable resistance from powerful food and
beverage industry actors, including litigation, which can undermine
innovative, evidence-based public health measures.9
Part I of this Article discusses the rise of diet-related chronic
diseases and the serious social and economic impacts on individuals
and societies. Part II examines federal, state, and local government
interventions to prevent these diseases. Part III discusses food and
beverage industry efforts to undermine public health regulations,
including lobbying and public messaging. Analyzing four case studies
from cities throughout the United States, Part IV identifies litigation
as a key component of the food and beverage industry’s strategy to
undermine local government measures promoting healthier diets.
Part V argues that local jurisdictions should prepare to defend their
public health laws and policies against industry litigation and suggests
steps to help ensure legal viability, political sustainability, and public
support.
I. DIET-RELATED CHRONIC DISEASES
Over the last four decades, there has been a significant rise in
overweight and obesity in the United States.10 These medical
conditions are unhealthy, harmful, and increase the risk of other
chronic and terminal health problems, including type 2 diabetes,
cardiovascular disease, and certain cancers.11 Recognizing these
health risks, and social and economic impacts, is imperative to fully
appreciate the gravity of the current public health crisis, which
demands meaningful attention from federal, state, and local
governments.

7. See infra Part III.
8. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Tackling Obesity and Disease: The Culprit Is Sugar;
the Response Is Legal Regulation, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5, 5–7 (2018).
9. See infra Part V.
10. J.N. Flegal et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among US Adults, 1999–
2000, 288 JAMA 1723, 1723–27 (2002); J.E. Manson & S.S. Bassuk, Obesity in the
United States: A Fresh Look at Its High Toll, 289 JAMA 229, 229–30 (2003).
11. Adult Obesity Causes & Consequences, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/adult/causes.html [https://perma.cc/8S34HYRD]; The Health Effects of Overweight and Obesity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/effects/index.html
[https://perma.cc/MXD5-N5K8].
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A. The Rise of Diet-Related Chronic Diseases
Public health professionals have raised concerns about the rapid
rise of diet-related chronic diseases. According to a 2011 study,
“nearly 70% of adults are classified as overweight or obese compared
with fewer than 25% forty years ago.”12 In 2014, more than one third
of adults in the United States had obesity.13 Among U.S. children
aged two through nineteen years, one in six, or approximately
seventeen percent, had obesity.14 These statistics indicate that obesity
now affects a significant portion of the population.
Public health and medical officials are particularly concerned about
rising obesity rates because obesity causes many adverse health
effects and is associated with an increased risk of premature death.15
Furthermore, “[i]f the current trends continue, obesity may overtake
cigarette abuse as the leading cause of preventable disease.”16 The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) has noted that
people who have obesity are at greater risk for a number of harmful
and potentially fatal diseases or conditions, including:
[H]igh blood pressure (Hypertension), [h]igh LDL cholesterol, low
HDL cholesterol, or high levels of triglycerides (Dyslipidemia),
[t]ype 2 diabetes, [c]oronary heart disease, [s]troke, [g]allbladder
disease, [o]steoarthritis (a breakdown of cartilage and bone within a
joint), [s]leep apnea and breathing problems, [s]ome
cancers . . . (endometrial, breast, colon, kidney, gallbladder, and
liver), [l]ow quality of life, [m]ental illness such as clinical
depression, anxiety, and other mental disorders, [and] [b]ody pain
and difficulty with physical functioning.17

Notably, obesity disproportionately affects low-income and
minority populations. In 2014, the obesity rate among non-Hispanic
black adults was 48.1% compared to 42.5% of Hispanic adults and
34.5% of non-Hispanic white adults.18 The obesity rate among

12. Carl J. Lavie et al., Obesity and Cardiovascular Disease: Risk Factor,
Paradox, and Impact of Weight Loss, 53 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1925, 1925 (2009).
13. Adult Obesity Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,

https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html [https://perma.cc/AE9D-HHBX].
14. Childhood Obesity Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/childhood.html [https://perma.cc/F54D-4G8W].
15. Luma Akil & H. Anwar Ahmad, Relationships Between Obesity and
Cardiovascular Diseases in Four Southern States and Colorado, 22 J. HEALTH CARE
FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 61, 63–64 (2011).
16. Id. at 64.
17. Adult Obesity Causes & Consequences, supra note 11.
18. CYNTHIA L. OGDEN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
PREVALENCE OF OBESITY AMONG ADULTS AND YOUTH: UNITED STATES, 2011–2014,
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Hispanic children was 21.9% compared to 19.5% of non-Hispanic
black children and 14.7% of non-Hispanic white children.19
According to a 2015 study, the association between race and ethnicity
and childhood obesity disappeared after controlling for family
income, indicating that socioeconomic status is more important than
race or ethnicity in predicting childhood obesity.20 Obesity and its
related health impacts threaten the most vulnerable populations.
B.

Costs of Diet-Related Chronic Diseases

In addition to the health and equity impacts of diet-related chronic
diseases, their increased prevalence raises significant concerns about
the economic impacts on individuals, families, and society.21 There
are two types of costs associated with the treatment of chronic dietrelated diseasesdirect costs and indirect costs.22 Direct costs result
from medical treatment, both inpatient and outpatient, including
surgeries, drug therapy, and laboratory and radiological tests.23
According to the CDC, the medical care costs of obesity are
estimated to be $147 billion per year.24 A 2011 study estimated that
the annual direct medical costs for people with obesity were $1,723
higher than normal weight persons.25 Professor John Cawley and
Professor Chad Meyerhoefer estimate that obesity-related health care
costs constitute 20.6% of national expenditures on health care.26
In addition to direct economic costs, obesity-related diseases result
in significant indirect costs, including absenteeism, lack of
productivity at work, increased insurance premiums, and lower
at 2 (2015), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db219.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E25V-GE8D].
19. Id. at 4.
20. Robert Rogers et al., The Relationship Between Childhood Obesity, Low
Socioeconomic Status, and Race/Ethnicity: Lessons from Massachusetts,
11 CHILDHOOD OBESITY 691, 691 (2015).
21. See Benjamin H. Harris & Aurite Werman, Obesity Costs Evident at the
State Level, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: UP FRONT BLOG (Dec. 12, 2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/12/12/obesity-costs-evident-at-thestate-level/ [https://perma.cc/R26B-8N45].
22. See Obesity Prevention Source: Economic Costs, HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCH.
OF PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/obesity-prevention-source/obesityconsequences/economic/ [https://perma.cc/B2EU-7WX4].
23. Id.
24. Adult Obesity Causes and Consequences, supra note 11. Estimates are in
2008 dollars.
25. Adam Gilden Tsai et al., Direct Medical Cost of Overweight and Obesity in
the United States: A Quantitative Systematic Review, 12 OBESITY REV. 50, 55 (2011).
26. John Cawley & Chad Meyerhoefer, The Medical Care Costs of Obesity: An
Instrumental Variables Approach, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 219, 226 (2012).
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wages.27 According to the CDC, the “annual nationwide productive
costs of obesity-related absenteeism range between $3.38 billion ($79
per obese individual) and $6.38 billion ($132 per obese individual).”28
If left unchecked, the rising prevalence of diet-related diseases
poses serious consequences for population health, the healthcare
system, and the economy more broadly.29 Preventative measures,
discussed in Part II, can improve individual and population health
outcomes and reduce the economic costs of chronic diet-related
diseases.
II. GOVERNMENT MEASURES TO PROMOTE HEALTHY DIETS AND
PREVENT DIET-RELATED CHRONIC DISEASES
As a result of the severe health impacts and social and economic
costs of diet-related disease, federal, state, and local governments are
taking steps to promote healthier diets and prevent obesity. Public
officials have a range of legal and policy interventions at their
disposal, including public awareness campaigns, nutrition information
and warnings on food labels and menu boards, taxes and subsidies,
and marketing restrictions.
A. Federal Government Action
The federal government, primarily through the Food and Drug
Agency (“FDA”) and the United States Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”), has taken steps to address obesity and nutrition. The
FDA is responsible for “ensuring the safety of our nation’s food
supply,” among other functions.30
Among its numerous
responsibilities, the FDA oversees the Nutrition Facts label on food
packaging, which includes information on calories, fats, sodium, and
vitamins.31 In May 2016, the FDA significantly updated the Nutrition
Facts label, requiring disclosure of the amount of added sugars in
grams and expressed as a percentage of the recommended daily
maximum intake, based on a 2000-calorie daily diet.32 The new

27. See Obesity Prevention Source: Economic Costs, supra note 22.
28. Adult Obesity Causes & Consequences, supra note 11.
29. Y Claire Wang et al., Health and Economic Burden of the Projected Obesity
Trends in the USA and the UK, 378 LANCET 815, 821–22 (2011).
30. See What We Do: FDA Mission, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/#mission [https://perma.cc/KRJ7-5U53].
31. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., A FOOD
LABELING GUIDE: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 43 (2013).
32. See Annie Gasparro & Mike Esterl, FDA Approves New Nutrition Panel
That Highlights Sugar Levels, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/
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Nutrition Facts label requirements were due to take effect in July
2018; however, the FDA recently issued a proposed rule extending
compliance dates to 2020 for large manufacturers and 2021 for
smaller companies.33
The USDA also issues policies and regulations to encourage
healthier diets and prevent obesity. Every five years, the USDA,
together with the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”), is required to publish a report containing dietary guidelines
based on the preponderance of current scientific and medical
knowledge.34 The USDA also administers the National School Lunch
Program, a meal program providing low-cost or free nutritionally
balanced lunches to children.35
Despite some progress, policy and law-making at the federal level
is impacted by interest group politics and lobbying,36 which contribute
to slow and inadequate action on obesity prevention.37 The Trump
administration has indicated it may roll back diet-related measures
adopted under the Obama administration (e.g., the Healthy, HungerFree Kids Act (2010)).38 Lack of political will at the federal level
leaves state and local governments as the most likely actors to take
meaningful action to prevent and control obesity in the coming years.
B.

State Government Programs

Although state governments enjoy broad authority to legislate on
matters of public health and nutrition, state efforts in response to
commercial food and beverage marketing and unhealthy eating
patterns have largely focused on educational settings. Between 2012
and 2013, twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia adopted
legislation relating to nutrition in schools or authorized funding for
school nutrition programs, which aim to increase access to healthy
articles/fda-approves-controversial-changes-to-nutrition-facts-panel-1463750195
[https://perma.cc/VPX3-K7KL].
33. See Proposed Extension of Compliance Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,753, 45,754
(proposed Oct. 2, 2017) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
34. See generally National Nutrition Monitoring and Related Research Act of
1990, 7 U.S.C. § 5341 (2012).
35. National School Lunch Program (NSLP), U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD &
NUTRITION SERV. (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/nslp/national-schoollunch-program-nslp [https://perma.cc/6NDJ-9RF3].
36. See discussion infra Section III.A.
37. See generally Reeve et al., supra note 5.
38. Jessica Taylor, Trump Administration Rolls Back Michelle Obama’s Healthy
School Lunch Push, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 1, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/
05/01/526451207/trump-administration-rolls-back-2-of-michelle-obamas-signatureinitiatives [https://perma.cc/SJK6-YL93].
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food products.39 In Colorado, for example, lawmakers prohibited the
provision or sale of food items containing any amount of industrially
produced trans-fat in public and charter schools.40 In addition to
nutrition standards and funding, states have also adopted laws on
nutrition education, physical activity and education, body mass index
(“BMI”) and student fitness screening, and diabetes screening and
management in schools.41
Despite legislative proposals and advocacy efforts on issues such as
taxes on sugary drinks, state governments have passed few legislative
measures outside educational and community settings. Facing
significant industry opposition, proposed public health-based taxes on
sugary drinks have failed in the California and New York state
legislatures.42 Multiple states have failed in their efforts to ban the
use of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”)
benefits to purchase sugary drinks.43 The USDA, which administers
SNAP, has denied state waiver requests that sought to exempt
unhealthy products from SNAP eligibility, recommending states
incentivize healthy food purchases rather than restricting SNAPeligible products.44 Like the federal government, state government
action on nutrition and obesity is hampered by industry opposition,
limited political will, and the complexities inherent in ensuring food

39. See, e.g., S. 12-068, 68th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2012); AMY
WINTERFELD, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGS., STATE ACTIONS TO REDUCE AND
PREVENT CHILDHOOD OBESITY IN SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES 3, 11 (2014). The
report defines school nutrition programs as those that “help ensure that students
have access to healthier food and beverage options at school or encourage other
community supports for child nutrition.” WINTERFELD, supra, at 11. Other categories
analyzed in the report include nutrition education and farm-to-school programs. Id.
at 17.
40. See Colo. S. 12-068; WINTERFELD, supra note 39, at 12.
41. See generally WINTERFELD, supra note 39.
42. Anemona Hartocollis, Failure of State Soda Tax Plan Reflects Power of an
Antitax Message, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/
nyregion/03sodatax.html [https://nyti.ms/2h91w2a] (discussing New York’s failure to
pass a tax on sugary beverages); Jeremy B. White, California Soda Tax Bill Pulled
Without a Vote, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.sacbee.com/
news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article71436032.html [https://perma.cc/WM45GXN3] (reporting on failed legislation in California that would have imposed a twocent tax on sugary beverages).
43. Caitlin Dewey, State Group: USDA Mulling Big Changes to Food Stamps,
Including Allowing States to Impose Soda Ban, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Dec. 8,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/08/state-group-usdamulling-big-changes-to-food-stamps-including-allowing-states-to-impose-sodaban/?utm_term=.865d7c1056c7 [https://perma.cc/SM6X-JD9Z].
44. Id.
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systems and environments that provide accessible, affordable,
sufficient, and nutritious food for all.
C.

Local Government Initiatives

Local governments have emerged as innovators and leaders in
public health laws and policies to prevent obesity and promote
healthier diets. “Home-rule,” the delegation of state power to local
jurisdictions, enables local governments to adopt laws and perform
functions that are typically reserved for state governments.45 In many
instances, local governments have adopted innovative and progressive
reforms that have failed at the state and federal levels.46 Bolder
reforms are enabled by a range of factors including smaller, more
homogeneous constituencies, less bureaucratic and time-consuming
law-making procedures, and proximity to constituents and their
challenges.47 Innovative local government initiatives to promote
access to nutritionally adequate diets include a Minneapolis
ordinance requiring grocery stores to stock staple foods48 and
increasing the available number of vending permits to sell fresh fruit
and vegetables from food carts in underserved areas of New York
City.49 Many local jurisdictions, including Boston and Baltimore,
incentivize the use of SNAP benefits at farmers’ markets, which has
increased consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables among SNAP
participants.50
45. Patrick M. Steel, Obesity Regulation Under Home Rule: An Argument That
Regulation by Local Governments Is Superior to Administrative Agencies,

37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1127, 1131 n.22 (2016).
46. Id. at 1139–42; see also H.R. 1687, 114th Cong. (2015) (referring to the
Subcommittee on Health); Mark Bittman, Opinion, Introducing the National Soda
Tax, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/opinion/markbittman-introducing-the-national-soda-tax.html [https://nyti.ms/1laWE5B] (discussing
a proposed federal soda tax). The proposed tax discussed in the article did not
advance past the House committee level.
47. Reeve et al., supra note 5, at 445.
48. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., ORDINANCE 10, § 203 (2017); see also Minneapolis
Health Dep’t, Staple Food Ordinance, MINNEAPOLISMN.GOV (Oct. 10, 2017),
http://www.minneapolismn.gov/health/living/eating/staple-foods [https://perma.cc/XL
35-LNAM] (“[The ordinance] requires licensed grocery stores (including corner
stores, gas stations, dollar stores, and pharmacies) to sell a certain amount of basic
food items including fruits and vegetables, whole grains, eggs, and low-fat dairy. The
staple foods ordinance was originally adopted in 2008, but was amended by the
Minneapolis City Council in October 2014 to set more comprehensive and clear
standards for food retailers.”).
49. NYC Green Carts, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/
health/health-topics/green-carts.page [https://perma.cc/43UQ-7PWE].
50. Healthy Incentives Programs, CITY OF BOS. (Mar. 29, 2018),
https://www.boston.gov/departments/food-initiatives/healthy-incentives-program
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In addition to measures to promote access to healthier foods, local
jurisdictions have also adopted measures to restrict availability and
discourage consumption of unhealthy products. The City of Los
Angeles, for example, restricts the density of fast food outlets51 and
many cities and counties ban the sale of sodas and other unhealthy
food and beverage products in schools.52
Public health-based taxes on sugary beverages, which can
discourage consumption, raise revenue for governments, and
encourage manufacturers to decrease the amount of sugar in their
products,53 are increasingly popular throughout the United States and
globally. After reviewing evidence from early adopters including
Mexico and the city of Berkeley, California, the World Health
Organization (“WHO”) recommended that governments adopt excise
taxes on sugary drinks, concluding that “[s]uch taxes lead to more
than proportional reductions in . . . consumption and net reductions in
caloric intake, and thus contribute to improving nutrition and
reducing overweight, obesity and NCDs.”54 Following Mexico’s
adoption of a one-peso-per-liter tax in 2013, sales of taxed products

[https://perma.cc/M45U-82K7]; Md. Farmers Market Ass’n, Using SNAP Benefits at
the Baltimore Farmers Market and Bazaar!, MD. FARMERS MKT. ASS’N: BLOG (Oct.

20, 2014), http://www.marylandfma.org/using-snap-benefits-at-the-baltimore-farmersmarket-and-bazaar/ [https://perma.cc/QV95-CPX9] (“Maryland Market Money
provides a $1 for $1 match, up to $10, per week when you spend your SNAP benefits
at market. Customers can earn an additional $10 each week at market, as long as
they spend their SNAP benefits with a participating vendor!”).
51. L.A., Cal., Fast Food Interim Control Ordinance 180103 (July 29, 2008).
52. Felice J. Freyer, Chances Are, Boston Schools Are Safe from Sugary Drinks,
BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/03/03/sugarydrinks-have-nearly-disappeared-from-boston-schools-study-finds/D9KM5qT1zGFA
USCEHPWCzN/story.html [https://perma.cc/H87Z-3PC6].
53. Sarah A. Roache & Lawrence O. Gostin, The Untapped Power of Soda

Taxes: Incentivizing Consumers, Generating Revenue, and Altering Corporate
Behavior, 6 INT’L J. HEALTH POL’Y & MGMT. 489, 490–91 (2017); see also Allison
Aubrey, PepsiCo Pledges to Cut Sugar as Big Soda Comes Under Scrutiny, NAT’L

PUB. RADIO (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/10/17/49827
4851/pepsico-pledges-to-cut-sugar-as-bigsoda-comes-under-scrutiny [https://perma.cc/
2YUM-7MTP]; Abby Norman, Pepsi Will Cut the Amount of Sugar in Its Sodas, &
It’s a Small Step Forward, ROMPER (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.romper.com/p/
pepsi-will-cut-the-amount-of-sugar-in-its-sodas-its-a-small-step-forward-20664
[https://perma.cc/VH8N-ES7E].
54. WORLD HEALTH ORG., FISCAL POLICIES FOR DIET AND PREVENTION OF
NONCOMMUNICABLE DISEASES 24 (2016). The WHO also recommends that
governments adopt taxes that raise retail prices of sugary beverages by at least twenty
percent. Id.
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fell by 5.5% in the first year and 9.7% in the second year.55 In 2014,
Berkeley became the first U.S. jurisdiction to implement a public
health-based tax on sugary drinks.56 In the first year, consumption in
Berkeley’s low-income neighborhoods fell by 21%.57 As of January
2018, six U.S. jurisdictions are levying similar taxes.58 Although
sugary drink taxes currently apply to a small fraction of the total
population, there is growing interest and momentum for such taxes,
especially among local governments.59
III. INDUSTRY ATTEMPTS TO THWART PUBLIC HEALTH
REGULATIONS
Taxes on sugary drinks, along with other government interventions
intended to reduce consumption of unhealthy food and beverage
products, conflict with the notion of individual autonomy and the
food and beverage industry’s commercial interests in maximizing
sales and profits.60 The food and beverage industry opposes
government measures that threaten profits and dedicates significant
resources to prevent the adoption of such measures and to undermine
existing ones. Industry’s strategic approach incorporates lobbying,
funding, and messaging techniques to influence policy-makers,
scientific evidence, and public opinion.
A. Lobbying
The food and beverage industry, including corporations and trade
groups, dedicates significant resources to influence federal, state, and

55. M. Arantxa Colchero et al., In Mexico, Evidence of Sustained Consumer
Response Two Years After Implementing a Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Tax,

36 HEALTH AFF. 1, 4 (2017).
56. Jennifer Falbe et al., Impact of the Berkeley Excise Tax on Sugar-Sweetened
Beverage Consumption, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1865, 1865 (2016).
57. Id. at 1867.
58. The six jurisdictions are: Albany, Berkeley, and Oakland, CA; Boulder, CO;
Philadelphia, PA; and Seattle, WA. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Op-Ed, 2016: The Year
of the Soda Tax, 95 MILBANK Q. 19, 19–20 (2017); Daniel Beekman, Prices Going Up
for Sugary Drinks as Seattle Tax Kicks In, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/promoting-health-at-a-hefty-priceseattles-soda-tax-starts-jan-1/ [https://perma.cc/DTR2-7FHL]; see also Laurel
Morales, The Navajo Nation’s Tax on Junk Food Splits Reservation, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/04/08/398310036/
the-navajo-nations-tax-on-junk-food-splits-reservation [https://perma.cc/54N7-Y2ET]
(discussing the Navajo Nation’s adoption of a tax of two percent on unhealthy foods,
which is not considered high enough to discourage purchases).
59. Gostin, supra note 58, at 1.
60. Steel, supra note 45, at 1143–44.
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local law and policy. Industry seeks to protect its interests by
influencing broader nutrition and diet policies and by combating
attempts to regulate the industry and its products.61 Between 2009
and 2015, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, and the American Beverage
Association (“ABA”) spent a total of $114.2 million on federal
lobbying.62 Specifically:
The ABA has lobbied against any government action . . . that might
raise the cost of soda production and marketing or discourage
consumption . . . [including] against nutrition labeling, packaging
standards, fair labor standard, the exclusion of sodas from food
assistance programs and school meals, limitations on franchises,
quotas on sugar, container deposit laws, and restrictions on
television advertising to children, among other issues.63

In the recent 2016 election cycle, the food and beverage industry
contributed over twenty-five million dollars to national campaigns.64
In addition to significant spending, the food and beverage industry
hires lobbyists to meet with members of both houses of Congress, the
White House, and various government agencies that promulgate
food-related regulations, including the USDA and the FDA.65
At the state level, the food and beverage industry has successfully
pushed for laws that prevent or nullify local government legislation
on nutrition,66 which is often more restrictive at the local level (e.g.,
soda taxes, menu labeling, and bans on toy giveaways with fast-food
meals for children). The legal doctrine of preemption refers to the
aversion, displacement, or negation of laws by conflicting laws made
by higher levels of government.67 Powerful industries, such as the
tobacco and firearms industries, have championed efforts to preempt
local regulations that could affect their bottom line.68 The American

61. MARION NESTLE, SODA POLITICS: TAKING ON BIG SODA (AND WINNING) 315
(2015).
62. JIM O’HARA & AVIVA MUSICUS, BIG SODA VS. PUBLIC HEALTH: HOW THE
INDUSTRY OPENS ITS CHECKBOOK TO DEFEAT HEALTH MEASURES 2 (2015).
63. NESTLE, supra note 61, at 315.
64. Ctr. for Responsive Pol., Food & Beverage: Long-Term Contribution Trends,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2016&
ind=N01 [https://perma.cc/V86F-NZBD].
65. NESTLE, supra note 61, at 317–18.
66. Rob Waters, Soda and Fast Food Lobbyists Push State Preemption Laws to
Prevent Local Regulation, FORBES (June 21, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
robwaters/2017/06/21/soda-and-fast-food-lobbyists-push-state-preemption-laws-toprevent-local-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/A6T2-EWDK].
67. James G. Hodge & Alicia Corbett, Legal Preemption and the Prevention of
Chronic Conditions, 13 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE 1, 1–2 (2016).
68. Id. at 3.
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Legislative Exchange Council, a group supported by conservative
foundations and corporations, promotes collaboration between
lobbyists and lawmakers to disseminate model preemption
legislation.69 Today, at least nine states have nutrition-related
preemption laws,70 which prevent local governments enacting
evidence-based regulations aimed at promoting healthier diets and
preventing obesity within their communities.71 In Ohio, for example,
state law preempts local regulation on the provision of nutrition
information in restaurants (e.g., calorie information on menus) and
customer incentive items (e.g., toys with children’s meals).72
In addition to lobbying federal and state lawmakers and agencies,
the food and beverage industry also lobbies at the local level.
Companies and trade associations hire well-connected consultants
with ties to local liberal and conservative politicians. In its efforts to
oppose taxes on sugary drinks in San Francisco and Berkeley, for
example, the soda industry engaged a research firm that had
previously worked for Michelle Obama’s Let’s Move! initiative and
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the nation’s largest public
health philanthropy organization.73 In Cook County, the Can the Tax
Coalition and other repeal advocates lobbied individual members of
the Board of Commissioners, and soda companies made donations to
commissioners in favor of repeal via political action committees.74
Looking forward, the rise of local government measures to promote
healthier diets will likely be accompanied by increased industry
lobbying at the local level.

69. Waters, supra note 66.
70. Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Mark Pertschuk, State Preemption: A Significant and
Quiet Threat to Public Health in the United States, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 900, 901
(2017).
71. See id.
72. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3717.53 (West 2018).
73. See Soda Industry Spent $67 Million Opposing State, City Soda Taxes &
Warning Labels: Total Big Soda Federal Lobbying at About $14 Million a Year, CTR.
FOR SCI. PUB. INT. (Sept. 21, 2016), https://cspinet.org/news/soda-industry-spent-67million-opposing-state-city-soda-taxes-warning-labels-20160921
[https://perma.cc/AVR2-C9XZ].
74. Caitlin Dewey, Why Chicago’s Soda Tax Fizzled After Two Months—and
What It Means for the Anti-Soda Movement, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Oct. 10,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/10/10/why-chicagos-sodatax-fizzled-after-two-months-and-what-it-means-for-the-anti-soda-movement/
[https://perma.cc/U522-6WXH].
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Funding Scientific Research

As part of its overall strategy, the food and beverage industry has
funded scientific research that tends to shift the responsibility for
health impacts away from their products. Recently uncovered
internal sugar industry documents chronicle decades of sugar industry
influence on the development of scientific evidence on sugar and
heart disease.75
In 1967, the Sugar Association paid Harvard scientists to publish a
paper on the relationship between sugar, fat, and heart disease.76 In
addition to funding the research, Sugar Association executives
worked closely with the Harvard scientists, supplying articles for
review and reviewing drafts. The resulting paper, which was
published in the New England Journal of Medicine (“NEJM”), was
developed in response to studies associating sugar with increased
triglyceride levels linked to heart disease, as well as higher levels of
insulin directly connected to type 2 diabetes. The NEJM paper
minimized the link between sugar and heart health by emphasizing
the role of fat and saturated fat in cardiovascular problems.77
The industry-funded research proved successful in its aim to
minimize the criticism of sugar and shift the focus to fat.78 In 1976,
the Sugar Association won a public relations award for “influencing
the public opinion about the health effects of sugar consumption.”79
One of the Harvard scientists who authored the paper, D. Mark
Hegsted, later became the head of nutrition at the USDA, where he
was involved in drafting the forerunner to the federal government’s
75. Cristin E. Kearns et al., Sugar Industry and Coronary Heart Disease
Research: A Historical Analysis of Internal Industry Documents, 176 JAMA

INTERNAL MED. 1, 1–2 (2016).
76. Anahad O’Connor, How the Sugar Industry Shifted Blame to Fat, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/well/eat/how-the-sugar-industryshifted-blame-to-fat.html [https://nyti.ms/2jDtsxa]. According to the organization’s
website, the Sugar Association is:
[T]he scientific voice of the U.S. sugar industry, making a difference by
continuously supporting scientific research and sharing our knowledge of
sugar to increase consumer understanding and confidence in the role that
sugar plays in a nutritious, balanced and enjoyable diet . . . . The Sugar
Association, founded by members of the U.S. sugar industry, began in 1943
as the Sugar Research Foundation, dedicated to the scientific study of
sugar’s role in food and communication of that role to the public. In 1947,
the Association assumed its current name.
About Us, SUGAR ASS’N, https://www.sugar.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/QPB2TQ6Z].
77. O’Connor, supra note 76.
78. Id.
79. SUGAR COATED (Cutting Factory 2015).
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dietary guidelines.80 Research suggests that the sugar industry may
have had a long history of influencing federal diet and nutrition
policy.81
Industry efforts to influence scientific research continue to the
present day. A recent analysis found that studies sponsored by the
food and beverage industry were five times more likely to find no
positive association between consumption of sugary drinks and
weight gain or obesity than studies that reported no industry funding
or conflicts of interest.82 Increasing public recognition and criticism
of industry influence over scientific evidence led to the disbandment
of the Global Energy Balance Network (“Network”) in 2015.83 The
Network’s scientists undertook research that tended to blame weight
gain and obesity on lack of exercise rather than diet.84 Founded in
2014, the Network received $1.5 million from Coca-Cola.85 Despite
the Global Energy Balance Network president’s insistence that any
funding received from Coca-Cola did not influence the organization’s
activities, emails between the organization and Coca-Cola suggest
that the company wielded influence over the group’s strategy and
development.86 The chairman of the Department of Nutrition at
Harvard University, along with thirty-six other scientists, penned an
open letter criticizing the work of the Global Energy Balance
Network as “scientific nonsense.”87

80. O’Connor, supra note 76.
81. Kearns et al., supra note 75, at 7.
82. Maira Bes-Rastrollo et al., Financial Conflicts of Interest and Reporting Bias

Regarding the Association Between Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Weight Gain:
A Systematic Review of Systematic Reviews, PLOS MED., Dec. 2013, at 1, 2.
83. See Zosia Kmietowicz, Coca-Cola Funded Group Set Up to Promote “Energy
Balance” Is Disbanded, BMJ (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.bmj.com/content/351/
bmj.h6590 [https://perma.cc/B6VM-B5BM]; Anahad O’Connor, Research Group
Funded by Coca-Cola to Disband, N.Y. TIMES: WELL BLOG (Dec. 1, 2015 4:57 PM),

https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/01/research-group-funded-by-coca-cola-todisband/ [https://perma.cc/M8CF-KHLT].
84. Anahad O’Connor, Coca-Cola Funds Scientists Who Shift Blame for Obesity
Away from Bad Diets, N.Y. TIMES: WELL BLOG (Aug. 9, 2015, 5:25 PM),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/coca-cola-funds-scientists-who-shift-blamefor-obesity-away-from-bad-diets/ [https://perma.cc/HF8T-PT6E].
85. Id.
86. Nancy Fink Huehnergarth, Emails Reveal How Coca-Cola Shaped the AntiObesity Global Energy Balance Network, FORBES (Nov. 24, 2015, 3:24 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nancyhuehnergarth/2015/11/24/emails-reveal-how-cocacola-shaped-the-anti-obesity-global-energy-balance-network/#4607f42779a7
[https://perma.cc/W9NA-7QT9].
87. Michael F. Jacobson & Walter Willett, Letter to the Editor, Coke’s Skewed
Message on Obesity: Drink Coke. Exercise More., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015),
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Public Messaging

Industry-funded research feeds into the food and beverage
industry’s larger public messaging strategy, which emphasizes the
industry’s economic benefits, individual choice, personal
responsibility, and consumption of unhealthy food and beverage
products as an appropriate part of healthy lifestyles, including
balanced diets and physical activity.88 The ABA, together with CocaCola, Pepsi Co., and the Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, created a
website advising consumers on maintaining a healthy lifestyle while
nevertheless consuming their products.89 This website promotes the
idea that the key to a healthy lifestyle is “energy balance,” balancing
calories consumed with calories expended through exercise.90 The
website highlights product reformulation efforts by the industry, the
wide range of beverage choices available to consumers, and industrysponsored initiatives to promote healthier communities.91 Echoing
the work of the Global Energy Balance Network, this website
promotes unhealthy products under the guise of consumer
information in a manner that tends to shift the blame for obesity away
from their products to a lack of exercise.
D. Funding “Grassroots” Opposition
Amplifying the impact of its public messaging strategy, the food
and beverage industry fosters “grassroots” opposition to laws and
regulations promoting healthier diets and nutrition. Groups, such as
New Yorkers for Beverage Choices, Philadelphians Against the
Grocery Tax, and Can the Tax Coalition, typically receive support
and resources from the food and beverage industry to build a
coalition of individuals, small businesses, and community groups to
oppose proposed measures in their local jurisdictions.92 Through
activities that include flyer distribution, media appearances,
advertising, and public protests, these groups provide local voices

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/opinion/cokes-skewed-message-on-obesitydrink-coke-exercise-more.html [https://nyti.ms/1N51CTf].
88. E.g., Michael M. Grynbaum, Soda Makers Begin Their Push Against New
York Ban, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/02/
nyregion/in-fight-against-nyc-soda-ban-industry-focuses-on-personal-choice.html
[https://nyti.ms/2Gk8fVF]; AM. BEVERAGE ASS’N, http://www.balanceus.org/en/
[https://perma.cc/5V65-FJHZ].
89. See AM. BEVERAGE ASS’N, supra note 88.
90. See id.; see also O’Connor, supra note 84.
91. See AM. BEVERAGE ASS’N, supra note 88.
92. See infra Part IV.
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warning of the intrusion of the “nanny state” and of potential
negative economic impacts on communities and families.93 Part IV
examines specific examples of industry-supported “grassroots”
advocacy against local government measures in New York City,
Philadelphia, and Cook County, Illinois. Given the rise in local
governments’ use of their authority to discourage the consumption of
unhealthy products, the food and beverage industry will likely
continue to use innovative methods to generate maximum opposition
against measures that threaten their profits.
IV. INDUSTRY LITIGATION CHALLENGING LOCAL GOVERNMENT
MEASURES TO PROMOTE HEALTHIER DIETS
Litigation forms a key part of the food and beverage industry’s
strategy to limit local government measures that promote healthier
diets. This Article reports on research analyzing cases brought by the
food and beverage industry or industry-supported groups against
local governments in the United States, challenging the legality of
measures intended to discourage the consumption of unhealthy food
and beverage products and in which judgments have been delivered.
The increase in local government measures that conflict with the food
and beverage industry’s commercial interests will likely be met with
an increase in this type of litigation. This part discusses four cases.
A. New York City Soda Portion Cap Rule
In September 2012, the New York City Board of Health adopted
the “Portion Cap Rule,” which prohibited the sale of sugary drinks in
containers larger than sixteen ounces.94 The Portion Cap Rule
formed part of New York City’s broader strategy to reduce dietrelated chronic diseases among the city’s residents.95 An opposition
campaign, led by New Yorkers For Beverage Choices, an industrybacked grassroots-style group, framed the rule as an encroachment on
personal freedoms by Mayor Bloomberg’s “nanny state.”96
Opponents of the rule also cultivated relationships with minority

93. See infra Part IV.
94. Natalie Blazer, 20 Ounces to Freedom: Soda Ban Ball in City Council’s Court,
WEIL: PROD. LIAB. MONITOR (July 2, 2014), https://product-liability.weil.com/
food-and-beverage/20-ounces-to-freedom-soda-ban-ball-in-city-councils-court/
[https://perma.cc/A9MU-AYY7].
95. See N.Y.C. OBESITY TASK FORCE, REVERSING THE EPIDEMIC: THE NEW
YORK CITY OBESITY TASK FORCE PLAN TO PREVENT AND CONTROL OBESITY 12–14
(2012).
96. Grynbaum, supra note 88.
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lawmakers and argued against the rule on the basis that it would
disproportionately impact vulnerable populations, as well as minorityowned businesses.97 Between 2009 and 2015, the beverage industry
spent more than fifteen million dollars in New York State
campaigning against the Portion Cap Rule and other nutrition-related
initiatives, including a proposed statewide soda tax.98
In October 2012, before the Portion Cap Rule went into effect, six
national and statewide not-for-profit and labor organizations
commenced a hybrid Article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment
action seeking to invalidate the rule.99 This action, New York

Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New
York City Department of Health & Mental Hygiene,100 was heard by

the Supreme Court of the County of New York, which invalidated the
rule and permanently enjoined the City from implementing it.101 The
New York court found that the New York City Board of Health was
an administrative agency and, therefore, did not possess the requisite
authority to promulgate this law.102 It also held that the rule was
arbitrary and capricious.103
The New York State Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s
judgment on the basis that the board had exceeded the scope of its
regulatory authority.104 Boreali v. Axelrod,105 an earlier New York
case on administrative agency authority, sets out a two-step analysis
to determine whether a government agency has exceeded its
regulatory authority by engaging in policy-making that is reserved for
the legislative body.106 First, the court must determine whether the

97. Id.
98. See Soda Industry Spending Against Public Health Tops $100 Million:
Spending Since 2009 Targets Taxes, Warning Label Measures, CTR. FOR SCI. PUB.
INT. (Aug. 25, 2015), https://cspinet.org/new/201508251.html [https://perma.cc/VPZ3Y4DN].
99. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538, 542 (N.Y. 2014). Private plaintiffs can use
an Article 78 proceeding to challenge an administrative, or other governmental
agency’s actions. See N.Y. Supreme Court, Civil Branch, How to Start a Special
Proceeding, N.Y. COURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/1jd/supctmanh/SelfRep%20Forms/Special%20Proceeding2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BJ8-8ZKX].
100. 16 N.E.3d 538 (N.Y. 2014).
101. Id. at 542.
102. Id. at 542, 545–46.
103. Id. at 542.
104. Id. at 541.
105. 517 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1987).
106. See generally id. (finding that a city agency engaging in a cost-benefit analysis
was engaging in legislative conduct reserved for city council, the city’s legislative
branch of government).
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government agency is regulatory or legislative.107 If the agency
merely possesses regulatory authority, the court should then
determine whether the agency exceeded this limited authority and
engaged in legislative policy making.108 If the regulatory agency has,
in fact, engaged in legislative action or policy-making, the court
should necessarily invalidate its rule, as it violates the separation of
powers.109
Applying Boreali, the New York Court of Appeals held that the
New York City Board of Health’s role was regulative, rather than
legislative.110 Referring to the New York City Charter, the court
determined that the sole legislative body within the city’s government
is the New York City Council.111 “While the charter empowers the
City Council ‘to adopt local laws for . . . public welfare,’” it also limits
the New York City Board of Health’s rulemaking authority to the
publication of the health code.112 Under the City Charter, the New
York City Board of Health has the authority to “add to and alter,
amend or repeal any part of the health code, . . . [to] publish
additional provisions for security of life and health in the city and [to]
confer additional powers on the [Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene] not inconsistent with the constitution, laws of this state or
this charter.”113 Given these limitations, the court determined that
the New York City Board of Health’s authority was restricted to
regulatory functions.114

107. See id. at 1353–57; see also N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 543–45.
108. See Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1353–57; see also N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d
at 543–45.
109. See Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1353.
110. See N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 543–45.
111. Id. at 542.
112. Id. at 544 (quoting N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 28(a) (2004)). The Charter further
prevents the N.Y.C. Board of Health from intruding on the city council’s legislative
power by limiting the N.Y.C. Board of Health’s authority to matters within the
authority of the Department of Health. Id.
113. Id. (quoting N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 558(b)). Notably, the New York City
Charter sets out that “[t]he City Council is the sole legislative branch of City
government; it is ‘the legislative body of the city . . . vested with the legislative power
of the city.’” Id. at 543 (quoting N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 21).
114. Id. at 544 (quoting N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 28(a)) (“Nonetheless, the Charter
contains no suggestion that the Board of Health has the authority to create laws.
While the Charter empowers the City Council “to adopt local laws . . . for the
preservation of the public health, comfort, peace and prosperity of the city and its
inhabitants, the Charter restricts the Board’s rulemaking to the publication of a
health code, an entirely different endeavor.”).
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The court then turned to whether “the Board properly exercised its
regulatory authority in adopting the Portion Cap Rule.”115 The court
emphasized that the Boreali analysis should “center on the theme
that ‘it is the province of the people’s elected representative, rather
than appointed administrator, to resolve difficult social problems by
making choices among competing ends.’”116 Therefore, “[t]he focus
must be on whether the challenged regulation attempts to resolve
difficult social problems in this manner,” and the task of this policymaking is reserved to the legislative branch.117 In analyzing the
Portion Cap Rule, the court determined that (1) crafting the Portion
Cap Rule required complexity that exceeded simple rule-making and
drifted into policy-making due to “value judgments concerning
personal autonomy and economics”;118 (2) the New York City Board
of Health did not have any policy foundation upon which to craft the
rule and thus “did not simply fill in details guided by independent
legislation”;119 and (3) the New York City Board of Health tried to
“fill the vacuum and impose a solution of its own.”120 Given these
factors, the court concluded that the Board of Health’s conduct had
amounted to policy-making, thereby exceeding its regulatory
authority.121 Because the regulatory agency engaged in impermissible
policy-making, the court of appeals invalidated the Portion Cap
Rule.122
B.

Philadelphia Soda Tax

In June 2016, the Philadelphia City Council voted 13-4 in favor of
the Philadelphia Beverage Tax (“PBT”), a. 1.5-cent-per-ounce tax on
sugary, diet, and low-calorie beverages.123 The PBT was expected to
raise ninety million dollars annually.124 Philadelphia Mayor Jim
Kenney championed the tax as an additional source of revenue to
improve community resources, including parks, recreation centers,
and libraries, and to fund universal pre-kindergarten for
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 546.
Id. (quoting Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1350 (N.Y. 1987)).
Id.
Id. at 548.
Id.
Steel, supra note 45, at 1132–36 (quoting Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1356).
N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 548.
Id. at 549.
Dann Cuellar, Philadelphia City Council Passes Beverage Tax with 13-4 Vote,

6ABC NEWS (June 17, 2016), http://6abc.com/news/philadelphia-city-council-passesbeverage-tax-/1388228/ [https://perma.cc/L24F-5ZVF].
124. Id.

2018]

BIG FOOD AND SODA

1071

Philadelphia’s children.125
Mayor Kenney’s public statements
emphasized the tax’s revenue raising potential, paying little attention
to the potential public health benefits of the tax.126 Opponents of the
tax, including the industry-funded group Philadelphians Against the
Grocery Tax, framed the tax as an unfair intrusion on personal choice
that would raise grocery bills and cause job losses.127 Both opponents
and supporters, such as the group Philadelphians for a Fair Future,
spent millions of dollars promoting their view of the tax to the public.
During the first half of 2017, the ABA spent more than three million
dollars on advertisements opposing the tax.128 Between mid-July and
mid-September of the same year, Michael Bloomberg, the former
Mayor of New York City, contributed over two million dollars to
fund ads in favor of the tax.129
In addition to seeking to shape public opinion against the tax, the
ABA, together with a group of individuals and small businesses, filed
a lawsuit challenging the tax in September 2016.130 The plaintiffs
alleged that the PBT is preempted by state tax laws and federal
SNAP regulations and violates the Uniformity Clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.131 The Philadelphia Court of Common
Pleas dismissed the lawsuit in December 2016, enabling the tax to go
into effect shortly thereafter.132 The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal
to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, which heard arguments
in April 2017 and affirmed the lower court’s dismissal in June 2017.133
The commonwealth court upheld the lower court’s finding that the
PBT was not preempted by Pennsylvania State tax law.134 Under the
Pennsylvania Sterling Act, which aims to protect against double
taxation by city and state governments, cities have broad local

125. Id.
126. Luc Cohen, Philadelphia Passes Soda Tax After Mayor Rewrites Playbook,
REUTERS (June 16, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-beverages-philadelphiasodatax/philadelphia-passes-soda-tax-after-mayor-rewrites-playbook-idUSKCN0Z2
2G3 [https://perma.cc/6GE9-V4K4].
127. FAQs, NO PHILLY GROCERY TAX, http://nophillygrocerytax.com/faq.aspx
[https://perma.cc/476Z-8EHQ].
128. Joe Trinacria, All Those Philly Soda Tax Ads Cost $5.4 Million This Year,
PHILLY MAG. (Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.phillymag.com/news/2017/09/27/soda-taxlobbyists-spent-millions-tv-ads/ [https://perma.cc/6SSQ-9HVU].
129. Id.
130. Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 164 A.3d 576, 576, 580–81 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2017).
131. Id. at 580–82.
132. Id. at 580–84.
133. Id. at 579.
134. Id. at 587.
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taxation authority to generate revenue but are preempted from
exercising this authority on a product or transaction subject to a state
tax.135 In the current case, the plaintiffs claimed that the PBT was
preempted by the state’s existing sales tax on sugary beverages and
sodas.136 The commonwealth court rejected this argument, holding
that the tax is not duplicative because the city tax is levied on nonretail distributions whereas the state tax is levied on retail sales and
payable by consumers.137
On the issue of federal preemption, the commonwealth court
found that SNAP regulations and requirements did not preempt the
PBT.138 Section 2013(a) of the Federal Food Stamp Act, and section
204(46) of the Tax Code preclude a government from imposing a tax
on items bought using SNAP benefits.139 The commonwealth court
affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of this claim, ruling that the
controlling federal SNAP statute and regulations “only prohibit the
imposition of a tax on retail purchase transactions, and not a tax on
non-retail distribution transactions,” such as the current PBT.140 The
court again emphasized that the PBT is a tax on the “distributors or
dealers upon distribution,” not the consumer.141 Furthermore, the
“fact that the PBT may be passed on to recipients through higher
retail prices does not alter the incidence of the PBT nor transform it
into a prohibited tax within the purview of [s]ection 2013(a) of the
Food Stamp Act, its regulations, or [s]ection 204(46) of the Tax
Code.”142 Thus, because the tax is imposed at the distributor level, it
is not preempted by state or federal law.
Finally, the commonwealth court affirmed the lower court’s finding
that the PBT did not violate the Pennsylvania Constitution’s
Uniformity Clause. The Uniformity Clause requires uniform taxation

135. Blauner’s Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 198 A. 889, 890–91 (Pa. 1938); see also
53 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 15971 (West 2017).
136. Dan Packel, Philly Defends Soda Tax Against Beverage Groups’ Challenge,
LAW360 (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/850051/philly-defends-sodatax-against-beverage-groups-challenge [https://perma.cc/K2JJ-63V9].
137. Williams, 164 A.3d at 587 (“The subject matter of the tax, the non-retail
distribution of sugar-sweetened beverages for sale at retail in the City, and the
measure of the tax, per ounce of sugar-sweetened beverage, are distinct from the
Sales Tax imposed under the Tax Code upon the retail sale of the sugar-sweetened
beverage of the ultimate purchaser.”).
138. Id. at 594.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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of items within the same class.143 The commonwealth court held that
the PBT only created one class: distributors of taxed beverages.144 It
further found that the manner and measure of calculating the tax
indicates that it is a specific tax uniformly applied to all members of
the class, distributors, and therefore meets the requirements of the
uniformity clause.145
The soda industry has not been deterred by the commonwealth
court’s affirmation of the lower court’s dismissal of its claims
challenging the PBT. On July 13, 2017, the plaintiffs in the suit filed a
petition to appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.146 In January
2018, the court granted the petition on a limited basis, stating it will
determine whether the tax violates the Sterling Act.147
C.

Cook County Soda Tax

In November 2016, the Cook County Board of Commissioners
enacted the Sweetened Beverage Tax Ordinance (“SBTO”), a onecent-per-ounce tax on sweetened beverages.148 The ordinance defines
a “sweetened beverage” as “any non-alcoholic beverage, carbonated
or non-carbonated, which is intended for human consumption and
contains any caloric sweetener or non-caloric sweetener, and is
available for sale in a bottle or produced for sale through the use of
syrup and/or powder.”149 Exemptions include 100% natural fruit and
vegetable juices, infant formula, beverages for medical use, and
“beverages to which a purchaser can add, or request that a retailer
add, caloric sweetener or non-caloric sweetener.”150 Unlike the PBT,
143. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
144. Williams, 164 A.3d at 595.
145. Id. at 584 (finding compelling the lower court’s finding that “all distributors
are subject to the same tax calculation formula and therefore no disparate treatment
exists within a distributor class in regard to the formula and rate of tax” and that “the
only classes created by the PBT are distributors and arguably [sugar-sweetened
beverages] which are one and the same for purposes of this analysis,” and that “[t]he
consumer and retailer classes identified by [Objectors] are not classes created by the
PBT and are therefore not subject to tax liability under the PBT.” (alteration in
original)). “The PBT is not imposed on the ownership of the sugar-sweetened
beverages or on their sale; rather, it is only imposed if the beverages are supplied,
acquired, delivered, or transported for purposes of holding them out for retail sale in
the City.” Id. at 595.
146. Petition for Allowance of Appeal, Williams, 164 A.3d 576 (No. 321 EAL
2017).
147. Order for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court,
Williams, 164 A.3d 576 (No. 321 EAL 2017).
148. Cook County, Ill., Ordinance 16-5931, § 74-852(a) (repealed 2017).
149. Id. at § 74-851.
150. Id.
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the SBTO is imposed on the purchaser or consumer, rather than the
distributor, and the tax must be included in the price of the
product.151 Perhaps in an effort to avoid potential preemption
challenges emanating from SNAP regulations, the ordinance indicates
that ordinarily taxed items purchased using SNAP benefits are
exempt from the SBTO.152
The SBTO was enacted in an express “effort to promote public
health, including lowered obesity rates.”153 The ordinance cited data
and evidence on the health impacts of consumption of sugary drinks
from the WHO, the CDC, and the American Medical Association.154
In addition to public health benefits, the tax was expected to raise
$200 million in revenue for 2018 alone.155
In the lead-up to, and following the Board of Commissioners 8-8
tied vote on the tax, broken by Board President Toni Preckwinkle,
there had been significant division on the desirability of Cook
County’s tax. The Can the Tax Coalition, largely funded by tax
opponents including the ABA, ran a lengthy and well-resourced
public messaging campaign framing the tax as an ineffective public
health measure that would place a heavy economic burden on
businesses and families.156 As seen in Philadelphia, opponents spent
heavily on advertisements and public relations, including circulating
fliers petitioning for the repeal of the tax in local malls and shopping
centers. The Can the Tax Coalition spent at least $3.2 million on
radio and television ads against the tax, while former New York City

151. Id. at § 74-852(b)–(c).
152. See id. § 74-852; see also Ill. Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Cook Cty. Dep’t of
Revenue, No. 17 L 50596, 2017 WL 3318078, at *3 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 28, 2017). The
court explains that in purchases where the consumer is using SNAP benefits to
purchase the sweetened beverage, the retailer must do one of two things:
First, if the tax is separately stated on a retailer’s cash register receipts, the
POS system should be programmed not to charge the tax. Second, if the tax
is included in the selling price on a retailer’s cash register receipt, the POS
system should be programmed to reduce the price by the amount of tax. If
this programming is not possible, the retailer must have a procedure
whereby a purchaser who uses SNAP benefits can receive an immediate
refund at the customer service desk or other location within the retailer’s
premises.

Id.

153. Ill. Retail Merchs., 2017 WL 3318078, at *2.
154. See generally Cook County, Ill., Ordinance 16-5931 (repealed 2017).
155. Jennifer Maloney & Shayndi Raice, Expanded Soda Taxes Stir Pushback,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/expanded-soda-taxes-stirpushback-1504288005 [https://perma.cc/H6JL-96LP].
156. Frequently
Asked
Questions,
CAN
THE
TAX
COAL.,
http://www.stopthecookcountytax.com/faq.aspx [https://perma.cc/AH2Q-WMKR].
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Mayor Michael Bloomberg spent more than $10 million on ads
promoting the public health benefits.157
On June 27, 2017, four days prior to the tax taking effect, the
plaintiffs, including the Illinois Retail Merchants Association, filed a
complaint for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment to
preemptively enjoin collection of the tax.158 The plaintiffs challenged
the SBTO on two primary grounds, arguing that the SBTO violated
the Illinois Constitution’s uniformity clause159 and that the ordinance
was unconstitutionally vague.160 The Circuit Court of Cook County
rejected these two arguments and upheld the SBTO.
The court found that the SBTO did not violate Illinois’s uniformity
clause. The Illinois Constitution provides for uniform taxation of
similar products to enforce minimum standards of fairness and
reasonableness between groups of taxpayers.161 To survive scrutiny, a
non-property tax classification must (1) be based on a real and
substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed,
and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the
legislation or to public policy.162 The plaintiffs primarily challenged
the SBTO as non-uniform because the tax does not apply to
sweetened beverages that are made to order. The plaintiffs alleged
that exception (3) of the SBTO, which states that, “beverages to
which a purchaser can add, or can request that a retailer add, caloric
sweetener or non-caloric sweetener,” was arbitrary and
unreasonable.163 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that pre-made
sweetened beverages (e.g., bottled frappuccino) and on-demand,
custom sweetened beverages (e.g., handmade frappuccino) are

157. Hal Dardick, Anti-Pop-Tax Hired Guns Pay $11 an Hour for Workers to
‘Educate’ Cook County Voters on Repeal, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 29, 2017),

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-cook-county-pop-tax-ads-met20170929-story.html [https://perma.cc/X4XN-4S6N].
158. Ill. Retail Merchs., 2017 WL 3318078, at *3.
159. Id. at *4. The plaintiffs argue that while pre-made, or ready-to-drink sugary
beverages would be subject to the tax, on-demand, or custom sweetened beverages
were exempted from the tax, therefore creating classifications that are not based on
any real or substantial differences in violation of the Illinois’s constitution Uniformity
Clause. Id.
160. Id. (“Specifically, the Merchants contend that the Ordinance is inconsistent
with how sweetened beverages in non-pre-determined size containers (such as
fountain drinks) are served and is inconsistent and may run afoul of the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”), the Illinois Retailers’
Occupation Tax, and the City of Chicago’s Alternative Pricing System Rules.”).
161. Id. at *5, *8.
162. Id. at *5.
163. Id. at *2, *6.
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substantially similar and therefore must be taxed in the same way.164
The defendants emphasized that the two products are different in two
distinct ways: (1) pre-made sweetened beverages are more widely
available and thus more likely to be purchased than on-demand
specialty drinks, and (2) it is easier to administer the tax on pre-made
products, because the cashier is not required to make a determination
about whether the product is taxable at the point of sale.165 The court
found that the difference in availability, opportunity for purchase, and
subsequently the “differences in revenue between classifications
constitute[d] a real and substantial difference” between the pre-made
beverages that are taxed and the custom-made drinks that are not.166
Additionally, the court determined that imposing the tax on made-toorder beverages would be administratively burdensome, further
demonstrating a real and substantial difference between a seemingly
similar class of beverages.167
After concluding that there was a real and substantial difference
between the tax on pre-made products and made-to-order beverages,
the court determined that the tax’s structure bore a reasonable
relationship to its objective of promoting health and lowering rates of
obesity. The court noted that it is “not constrained by the question of
whether the legislature should have taxed all sweetened beverages
that may contribute to obesity.”168 In its decision, the court referred
to the “many findings from studies, agencies, and organizations
explaining the adverse health impact of sweetened beverage
consumption.”169
The court also found that the SBTO was not unconstitutionally
vague. The Illinois Supreme Court has explained that “[a] statute can
be impermissibly vague for one of two independent reasons: (1) if it
fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits, or (2) if it
authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.”170
When examining whether a statute is
unconstitutionally vague, courts consider the statutory construction
164. Id. at *4.
165. Id. at *6.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *7–8.
168. Id. at *9.
169. Id. at *8.
170. City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enters., Inc., 865 N.E.2d 133, 165–66 (Ill. 2006).
When the court considers statutes with civil, rather than criminal, penalties regulating
economic matters, the test for vagueness is “less strict.” See Ill. Retail Merchs., 2017
WL 3318078, at *9.
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and plain language of the statute “in light of its common
understanding and practice.”171 The plaintiffs’ arguments focused on
the sale of drinks in non-predetermined size containers (fountain
drinks) and alleged inconsistency with SNAP, the Illinois Retailers’
Occupation Tax, and the City of Chicago’s Alternative Pricing System
Rules.172
The plaintiffs alleged that the application of the tax to fountain
drinks would lead to the imprecise collection of taxes, which could
expose retailers to litigation.173 While the court acknowledged the
possibility of imprecise collection, it decided that this did not meet the
standard of rendering the ordinance unconstitutionally vague.174 The
judgment noted that the ordinance allowed for a five percent discount
on the amount of tax payable with respect to syrup or powder for
fountain drinks, taking into account spillage and product preparation
at the retail level.175
The plaintiffs also alleged that the requirement for the tax to be
included in the sale price means that retailers could not comply
without violating federal law prohibiting application of state or local
sales taxes on purchases made with SNAP benefits.176 The court held
that this argument was overcome by the ordinance provisions
requiring point-of-sale programing to avoid charging the tax on
SNAP purchases or, if this was not possible, providing an immediate
refund at the customer service desk or other location.177 The court
made similar findings in relation to alleged conflicts with the Illinois
Retailers’ Occupation Tax and the City of Chicago’s Alternative
Pricing System Rules.178
Despite the decision confirming its legal validity, the Cook County
Board of Commissioners voted overwhelmingly to repeal the SBTO
in October 2017.179 The tax appears to have been plagued by a lack

Ill. Retail Merchs., 2017 WL 3318078, at *9.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *11.
See id.
Associated Press & Julian Crews, Cook County Board Approves Repeal of
Soda Tax, WGN9 (Oct. 11, 2017, 7:11 AM), http://wgntv.com/2017/10/11/vote-to171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

repeal-cook-county-soda-tax-expected-today/ [https://perma.cc/67BN-Y9KE].
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of popular support, fostered by the industry’s public messaging
campaign, administrative issues, and multiple lawsuits.180
D. San Francisco Soda Warning Ordinance
In 2015, San Francisco became the first United States jurisdiction
to pass legislation requiring soda companies to include a statement on
advertisements warning of the health impacts of consuming sugarsweetened beverages.181
Specifically, the ordinance required
companies to place warnings on advertisements on billboards,
vehicles, and similar structures, stating: “WARNING: Drinking
beverages with added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and
tooth decay. This is a message from the City and County of San
Francisco.”182 The ordinance required that this warning occupy
twenty percent of the total advertisement space.183 It applied to
advertisements for non-alcoholic beverages containing caloric
sweeteners and more than twenty-five calories per twelve ounces of
beverage, with exemptions for milk, milk alternatives, and 100%
natural fruit and vegetable juices.184 San Francisco’s purpose in
requiring the warning was to “inform the public of the presence of
added sugars and thus promote informed consumer choice that may
result in reduced caloric intake and improved diet and health, thereby
reducing illnesses to which [sugar-sweetened beverages] contribute
and associated economic burdens.”185

180. See Greg Trotter & Becky Yerak, Cook County Retailers Cheer Soda Tax
Repeal: ‘This Was a Nightmare’, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 11, 2017, 4:00 PM),

http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-soda-tax-repeal-reaction-20171011story.html [https://perma.cc/6D3K-FB7V]. In addition to the lawsuit discussed in this
Article, consumers sued retailers, including Walgreens, for allegedly misapplying the
tax. Id.
181. Corey L. Andrews, San Francisco’s Sweetened-Beverage Warning Mandate
and Ad Ban Treat on First Amendment, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2015, 5:37 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2015/09/11/san-franciscos-sweetened-beveragewarning-mandate-and-ad-ban-tread-on-first-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/AQ2X2NPS].
182. S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 42, div. 1, § 4202, 4203(a) (2016); Andrews,
supra note 181.
183. Dorothy Atkins, Beverage Industry Fights SF Soda Warnings at 9th Circ.,
LAW360 (Apr. 17, 2017, 10:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/914135
[https://perma.cc/VPS2-GMS4]; Court Blocks San Francisco Law Requiring
Warnings on Soda Ads, CBS S.F. BAY AREA (Sept. 19, 2017, 4:05 PM) [hereinafter
Court Blocks], http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2017/09/19/soda-ad-warning-labelblocked-9th-circuit-court/ [https://perma.cc/96AS-MP62].
184. HEALTH CODE § 4202.
185. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco (Am. Beverage II ),
871 F.3d 884, 888–89 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing HEALTH CODE § 4201).
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Shortly after the City passed the ordinance, the ABA, the
California Retailers Association, and the California State Outdoor
Advertising Association filed a suit in the United States District
Court, Northern District of California, to preliminarily enjoin the
ordinance, alleging that it violated the plaintiffs’ freedom of speech
and unjustly targeted sugar-sweetened beverages as a contributing
factor to the obesity epidemic.186 To obtain a preliminary injunction,
a plaintiff “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits,
that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and
that an injunction is in the public interest.”187
At the district court level, the judge found that the plaintiffs were
unlikely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim and
were unlikely to suffer irreparable harm if the ordinance went into
effect.188 Furthermore, the district court found that even if the
plaintiffs may succeed on the merits, the balancing test would weigh
in favor of denying the injunction.189 The district court noted that the
city had a reasonable basis to enforce the ordinance due to its interest
in public health and safety.190 The plaintiffs subsequently appealed
the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed
the district court’s decision and upheld the preliminary injunction to
enjoin the San Francisco ordinance.191
First, the court of appeals found that the plaintiffs were likely to
succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claims.192 The
plaintiffs claimed that the warning label requirements infringed on
their First Amendment right to freedom of speech.193 While the First
Amendment freedom of speech protections may traditionally be
associated with individual liberty, the U.S. Supreme Court has
confirmed that these protections extend to commercial speech.194
186. Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 887–89; Atkins, supra note 183; see also Maura
Dolan, Federal Appeals Court Blocks San Francisco Law Requiring Health
Warnings on Soda, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2017, 12:25 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-soda-san-francisco-20170919-story.html
[https://perma.cc/DJA2-7FRP].
187. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
188. Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 889; Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of
San Francisco (Am. Beverage I ), 187 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1145–46 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
189. See Am. Beverage I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1146–47.
190. Id. at 1138, 1140, 1142, 1145.
191. Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 888, 899; see also Court Blocks, supra note 183.
192. Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 898.
193. Id. at 888.
194. “‘[E]ven if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument
to enlighten public decision-making in a democracy,’ the free flow of commercial
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Regulations on the content of noncommercial speech are subject to
strict scrutiny, meaning they are “presumptively unconstitutional and
may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly
tailored to serve compelling state interests.”195 Regulations on
commercial speech, such as sugary drink advertisements, are subject
to a lesser standard.196 The lesser standard of scrutiny flows from the
government’s “legitimate interest in protecting consumers from
commercial harms.”197
The level of scrutiny that applies to regulations on commercial
speech depends on the nature of the regulation.198 Restrictions on
“nonmisleading commercial speech regarding lawful activity” are
subject to intermediate scrutiny.199 Regulations that compel a
disclosure, rather than affirmatively limit speech, are subject to the
lesser standard of scrutiny set out by the Supreme Court in Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio.200
Here, the Ninth Circuit determined that the warning label constituted
a compelled disclosure and, therefore, applied the Zauderer test.201
The Zauderer test has three components—the compelled speech
(1) must be purely factual and uncontroversial; (2) must not be
unduly burdensome such that it may chill protected speech; and
(3) must be reasonably related to a substantial government interest.202
The Ninth Circuit found that the warning was not purely factual or
uncontroversial because it “convey[ed] the message that sugarsweetened beverages contribute to [certain] health conditions
regardless of the quantity consumed or other lifestyle choices.”203
The judgment suggested that the warning would likely satisfy the first
information serves that end because it is indispensable to ensuring that economic
decisions ‘in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.’” Id. at 890 (quoting Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976)). The Court has defined commercial speech as “expression related solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
195. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
196. Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 891.
197. Id. at 890–91 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011)).
198. Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 891.
199. Id. (quoting Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229,
249 (2010)). Intermediate scrutiny requires that regulations directly advance a
substantial government interest and be “no more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.” Id. (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
200. 471 U.S. 626 (1985); see Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 891.
201. Id. at 892–93.
202. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985).
203. Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 895.
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component of the Zauderer test if it stated that “overconsumption of
sugar-sweetened beverages contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth
decay” or “consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages may
contribute to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.”204 The Ninth
Circuit also held that the “black box warning overwhelm[ed] the
other visual elements in the advertisements” so much so that the
compelled disclosure was “unduly burdensome” and would chill
protected commercial speech in violation of the second component of
the Zauderer test.205 Having ruled that San Francisco’s required
warning failed the first two components of the Zauderer test, the
court ruled that the plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits of
their First Amendment claim.206
After establishing that the plaintiffs would likely succeed on the
merits, the court then turned to the remaining three factors that
determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction.
The court found that the plaintiffs would likely suffer irreparable
harm because they had made a colorable First Amendment claim.207
Next, the court balanced the hardships of each party and referred
back to its conclusion that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the
merits of their First Amendment claim.208 Finally, the court
examined whether the injunction would be in the public interest and
found that the public has a strong interest in upholding First
Amendment principles.209 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the
204. See id. at 893, 895. The Court went on to explain that “[b]ecause San
Francisco’s warning does not state that overconsumption of sugar-sweetened
beverages contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay, or that consumption of
sugar-sweetened beverages may contribute to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay, the
accuracy of the warning is in reasonable dispute.” Id. at 895. Furthermore, “[b]y
focusing on a single product, the warning conveys the message that sugar-sweetened
beverages are less healthy than other sources of added sugars and calories and are
more likely to contribute obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay than other foods,” which
the court notes is “deceptive in light of the current state of research on this issue.” Id.
Finally, while the state has “substantial leeway in determining appropriate
information disclosure requirements for business corporations,” it cannot require
companies to issue one-sided or misleading messages. Id. at 896 (quoting Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 15 n.12 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
205. Id. at 893, 897. “A disclosure requirement may be also unduly burdensome
and chill commercial speech if the disclosure promotes policies or views that are onesided or ‘are based against or are expressly contrary to the corporation’s views.’” Id.
at 894 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at 15 n.12).
206. Id. at 898. The court held that the compelled disclosure satisfied the third
limb of the Zauderer test because there was “no dispute that San Francisco ha[d] a
substantial government interest in the health of its citizens . . . .” Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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plaintiffs met the requirements for seeking a preliminary injunction
and accordingly reversed the district court’s decision and granted the
motion.210
Public health and health law organizations, including the American
Heart Association and the Public Health Law Center, filed amicus
curiae briefs in the district court and the court of appeals.211 The
briefs argued that the accuracy of the warnings is scientifically well
established and that the warnings should easily survive review under
the Zauderer framework.212 According to the Public Health Law
Center, the court of appeals’ judgment relied on evidence produced
by the industry that contradicts the well-established scientific
evidence on the health impacts of sugary beverages that was
presented in the amicus curiae briefs.213
In October 2017, following the court of appeals’ ruling, the Public
Health Law Center, together with nine other tobacco control and
public health organizations, filed a further amicus brief requesting an
en banc review by an expanded eleven-judge panel of the court of
appeals.214 The brief argued that the court of appeals’ original
decision misinterpreted the Zauderer test, jeopardizing governmentmandated public health warnings, including federal tobacco
warnings.215 For example, the brief argues that the decision’s
mischaracterization of the evidence-based warnings as “disputed
policy views” may be used by the tobacco industry to challenge
warnings mandated by the federal government.216 The brief also calls
for the court to clarify that the requirement for a warning covering
twenty percent of an advertisement does not render the regulation
per-se unconstitutional.217 Federal law requires that some tobacco
warnings occupy more than twenty percent of the packaging, meaning

210. Id. at 899.
211. See generally Brief for Am. Heart Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d 884 (No. 16-16072) [hereinafter Am. Heart
Ass’n et al. Ninth Circuit Brief]; Brief for Am. Heart Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Am. Beverage I, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
(No. 3:15-cv-03415 EMC) [hereinafter Am. Heart Ass’n et al. District Court Brief].
212. See Am. Heart Ass’n et al. Ninth Circuit Brief, supra note 211, at 4–15, 27–31;
Am. Heart Ass’n et al. District Court Brief, supra note 211, at 20–25..
213. See American Beverage Association, et al. v. The City and County of San
Francisco (2016), PUB. HEALTH LAW CTR., http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/
resources/american-beverage-association-et-al-v-city-and-county-of-san-francisco2016 [https://perma.cc/MA6Z-EMQG].
214. See generally Am. Heart Ass’n et al. Ninth Circuit Brief, supra note 211.
215. Id. at 1, 3.
216. Id. at 1, 8–9.
217. Id. at 14–17.
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the industry could cite the Ninth Circuit decision in support of a claim
that tobacco warnings are unduly burdensome under the Zauderer
test, rendering them unconstitutional.218
The San Francisco soda warnings litigation shows that calling into
question well-established evidence can help industry undermine
evidence-based warnings, threatening federal, state, and local efforts
to protect consumers from harmful commercial goods. The case
confirms the importance of courts’ interpretation of complex
scientific evidence in the context of First Amendment challenges to
public health-based restrictions on commercial speech, and the need
for governments to produce clear and convincing evidence in support
of their regulations.
In January 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed to hear
the matter en banc.219 An eleven-judge panel will further weigh the
protection of commercial speech against the government’s interest in
regulating advertisements to protect public health, providing further
opportunity for San Francisco to defend its evidence-based
warnings.220
V. LEGAL VIABILITY AND POLITICAL SUSTAINABILITY OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT MEASURES TO PROMOTE HEALTHIER DIETS
When public health measures come into tension with the potential
for sales and profitability, the food and beverage industry dedicates
significant resources to protecting its position.221 The industry’s
strategy comprises lobbying, funding scientific research, public
messaging, and litigation.222 Local governments investing in measures
to promote healthier diets must anticipate and prepare to overcome
each of these interrelated but distinct challenges.
This part
recommends steps to help ensure legal viability, political
sustainability, and public support.

218. Id. at 14–16.
219. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco (Am. Beverage
III ), 880 F.3d 1019, 1020 (2018) (“The three-judge panel disposition in these cases
shall not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit.”).
220. See Beverage Industry Challenge to SF Soda Warning Label Law Under
Review, CBS S.F. BAY AREA (Jan. 29, 2018), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2018/
01/29/challenge-soda-warning-law-under-review/ [https://perma.cc/LP8K-RMET].
221. See supra Part III.
222. See supra Part III.
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A. Legal Viability
The small but growing body of litigation and jurisprudence relating
to government interventions to promote healthy diets presents a
useful source of information to identify legal bases and arguments
that industry litigants invoke to support their suits against local
governments. This information may assist local government officials
to formulate and, if necessary, defend their laws against industry
litigation, ensuring legal viability.
Two basic but important issues are regulatory authority and
preemption.223 The case opposing New York City’s Portion Cap Rule
illustrates the importance of ensuring that laws and regulations are
grounded within the scope of the regulatory authority of the specific
government body making the rule. In that case, the court’s decision
that the New York City Board of Health had exceeded the scope of
its regulatory authority led to the invalidation of an innovative public
health measure.224 The judgments in the Philadelphia and Cook
County soda tax decisions also analyzed the regulatory authority of
the respective rule-making bodies,225 confirming the importance of
this issue for municipal law-makers. In addition to regulatory
authority, the law-making process may also affect the likelihood of
litigation and the longer-term viability of local government public
health measures. Of the eight U.S. jurisdictions that have adopted
public health-based soda taxes, the five that were passed via ballot
measures have not been challenged in court, while two of the three
adopted by governing boards have faced industry litigation.226
223. See infra notes 214–19 and accompanying text.
224. See generally Matter of N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of
Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538 (N.Y. 2014).
225. See Ill. Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Cook Cty. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 17 L 50596,
2017 WL 3318078, at *1, *11 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017); Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 164
A.3d 576, 589–90 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017).
226. The five jurisdictions that adopted a tax via ballot measure include: Boulder,
CO; Albany, CA; Berkeley, CA; Oakland, CA; and San Francisco, CA. See Gostin,
supra note 58, at 19; Nancy Fink Huehnergarth, Passage of Four Soda Tax Measures
Deals Major Blow to the Beverage Industry, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nancyhuehnergarth/2016/11/09/passage-of-four-soda-taxmeasures-deals-major-blow-to-the-beverage-industry/#1fd8ad1a3099 [https://perma.cc/
7TPZ-WGRD]. The three jurisdictions that adopted the tax via governing board
action include: Philadelphia, PA (challenged); Cook County, IL (challenged, but tax
repealed in October 2017); and Seattle, WA. See Beekman, supra note 58 (discussing
effects of the tax in Seattle); supra Section IV.B and accompanying footnotes
(discussing the Philadelphia soda tax litigation); supra Section IV.C and
accompanying footnotes (discussing the Chicago soda tax litigation). Seattle’s tax
went into effect on January 1, 2018, so it remains to be seen whether it will be
challenged in court. See generally Beekman, supra note 58.
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Preemption is another key legal issue local governments may face
when adopting public health measures to promote healthier diets.227
Preemption may flow from legislation designed to prevent local
jurisdictions from legislating on nutrition-related issues or when local
laws address a subject covered by existing state or federal law.228 This
issue was raised with respect to both federal and state laws in soda tax
The Commonwealth Court of
litigation in Philadelphia.229
Pennsylvania rejected the preemption argument because
Philadelphia’s tax is levied on non-retail distributions, whereas the
relevant state and federal laws addressed retail sales to consumers.230
The structure of public health-based taxes, in particular the point in
the distribution chain at which they are levied, may be an important
factor to overcome potential challenges based on preemption.
Evidence in support of local government public health measures
can play an important role in the adjudication of their legality.
Relevant evidence includes analysis of the health impacts of regulated
products and evidence of effectiveness of regulatory measures.
Courts use this type of evidence to determine whether regulations are
permissible, especially when courts are called upon to determine the
legality of public health measures that interfere with competing rights
and interests.231 For example, as part of its determination of whether
San Francisco’s soda warnings unlawfully infringed on commercial
freedom of speech, the Ninth Circuit considered the scientific
evidence of the health impacts of sugary drinks.232 In holding that the
required warning was not “purely factual and uncontroversial” as
required by Zauderer, the court held:
By focusing on a single product, the warning conveys the message
that sugar-sweetened beverages are less healthy than other sources
of added sugars and calories and are more likely to contribute to

227. NICOLE DUPUIS ET AL., NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF
PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 3 (2017) (“[Preemption is] the use of
state law to nullify a municipal ordinance or authority. State preemption can span
many policy areas including environmental regulation, firearm use and labor laws.
States can preempt cities from legislating on particular issues either by statutory or
constitutional law. In some cases, court rulings have forced cities to roll back
ordinances already in place.”).
228. See supra Section III.A.
229. See supra Section IV.B.
230. See Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 164 A.3d 576, 585–86, 591–92 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2017).
231. See, e.g., Ill. Retail Merchs. v. Cook Cty. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 17 L 50596,
2017 WL 3318078, at *1, *8–9 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2017).
232. See generally Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco,
871 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2017).
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obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay than other foods. This message is
deceptive in light of the current state of research on the issue.233

The Ninth Circuit’s conclusions appear to rely heavily on evidence
presented by the industry litigants, which contradicts well-established
scientific evidence that sugary drinks have a unique impact on public
health.234 This case illustrates the importance of the evidentiary basis
for public health measures. Perhaps even more crucially, local
lawmakers should anticipate that industry litigants will argue for the
most demanding evidentiary standards possible and produce evidence
that contradicts or questions health impacts and effectiveness. Local
government defendants should prepare to clearly articulate applicable
evidentiary standards and produce evidence to prove scientific facts
relevant to the case before judges who may not be familiar with
public health concepts and issues.
Many of the legal bases and arguments used by the food and
beverage industry to challenge interventions to promote healthier
diets reflect those used by the tobacco industry to challenge tobacco
control laws.235 An analysis of tobacco industry litigation to deter
local public health measures identified preemption as a common basis
for successful legal challenges.236 As with the Cook County and
Philadelphia soda taxes, the tobacco industry has challenged tobacco
taxes on the basis that they violate tax uniformity clauses of state
constitutions.237 Like the San Francisco soda warnings litigation, the
tobacco industry has invoked the First Amendment to challenge
federal regulations requiring tobacco companies to include graphic
images as part of warnings on tobacco packages.238
The soda
industry’s efforts to contradict or question scientific evidence
surrounding the health impacts of their products and the effectiveness
of government interventions reflect a long history of similar conduct

233. Id. at 895 (footnotes omitted).
234. See Am. Heart Ass’n et al. Ninth Circuit Brief, supra note 211, at 16–20; see
also supra Section IV.D.
235. Pamela Mejia, Food Industry Messaging Pulled from Big Tobacco Playbook,
BSMG BLOG (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.bmsg.org/blog/big-food-next-tobaccoindustry [https://perma.cc/SZ8Q-U5Z4].
236. M.L. NIXON ET AL., TOBACCO INDUSTRY LITIGATION TO DETER LOCAL
PUBLIC HEALTH ORDINANCES: THE INDUSTRY USUALLY LOSES IN COURT 65 (2004).
237. See supra Sections IV.B, IV.C. See generally Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 787
N.E.2d 786 (Ill. 2003); Hegar v. Tex. Small Tobacco Coal., 496 S.W.3d 778 (Tex.
2016).
238. See supra Section IV.D. See generally R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S.
Food & Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.C. 2012) (holding that a federal
regulation requiring tobacco companies to include graphic images violated the First
Amendment).
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by the tobacco industry.239 Acknowledging differences between the
tobacco industry240 and the food and beverage industry, and their
respective products, tobacco litigation is another source of
information for public officials working to ensure the legal viability of
interventions to promote healthier diets.
B.

Political Sustainability

In addition to legal viability, local lawmakers should also take into
account the political sustainability of measures to promote healthier
diets. Cook County provides an example where, although the legality
of the soda tax was confirmed by the circuit court, the measure was
ultimately repealed by the Board of Commissioners.241 As discussed
in Part IV, the repeal followed an industry-led campaign that fueled
public opposition against the soda tax.
Public demand for public health measures is key to their adoption
and their ongoing political sustainability.242 Strategies to increase
public demand include educating and informing the public to better
understand the need for, and benefits of, interventions that promote
healthy diets.243 Evidence of the positive public health impacts and
cost-effectiveness of measures can bolster public support.244
Increased public awareness of industry misconduct, such as the
obfuscation of scientific evidence on sugar and heart disease,
discussed in Part III, may also contribute to public support for
regulation of industries and products.245
Ensuring the legal viability and political sustainability of public
health interventions are interrelated but distinct challenges. The food
and beverage industry’s public messaging campaigns differ from
arguments put forth in litigation. The industry’s public messaging
strategy incorporates positive messages about consuming their
products as part of a “balanced,” physically active lifestyle.246

239. See generally Lisa A. Bero, Tobacco Industry Manipulation of Research, 120
PUB. HEALTH REP. 200 (2005).
240. Kelly D. Brownell & Kenneth E. Warner, The Perils of Ignoring History: Big
Tobacco Played Dirty and Millions Died. How Similar Is Big Food?, 87 MILBANK Q.
259, 261 (2009).
241. See supra Section IV.C.
242. See generally Terry T-K Huang et al., Mobilisation of Public Support for
Policy Actions to Prevent Obesity, 385 LANCET 2422 (2015).
243. Id. at 2424.
244. See John Cawley, The Economics of Childhood Obesity, 29 HEALTH AFF. 364,
367–70 (2010).
245. See Huang et al., supra note 242, at 2426.
246. See supra Section III.C.
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Industry strategy also includes negative messages about government
interventions, such as “nanny state” infringement on personal
freedoms and commercial interests, and negative economic impacts of
regulations on vulnerable population groups.247 These arguments are
not replicated in the courtroom, where industry attorneys focus on
legal grounds including regulatory authority and preemption.248
Although based on different arguments, industry lawsuits and
public messaging against government interventions tend to
complement and reinforce one another.
Local government
involvement as defendants in industry-initiated litigation, which tends
to be well publicized, lengthy, and expensive, may negatively
influence the public’s opinion of public health interventions, and
contribute to impetus for repeal. The Cook County lawsuit, for
example, has been identified as a factor that may have contributed to
the repeal of that jurisdiction’s soda tax.249 Although it is difficult to
measure, the politically charged nature of some public health
interventions, as well as vigorous public debates, may influence
judicial decision-making when measures are challenged in court.
Local government officials should anticipate and prepare to counter
industry challenges in both the public domain and in the courtroom.
Overall, litigation to date suggests that lawsuits challenging local
government laws and regulations can be avoided or overcome with
careful design, law-making processes, implementation, and
evaluation.250 Together with legal viability, political sustainability is
also important to ensure that measures impact consumption patterns
and, ultimately, improve the public’s health.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A HEALTHIER AND MORE PRODUCTIVE
FUTURE
Governments have numerous effective, evidence-based tools to
encourage healthier diets and prevent obesity, thus promoting health
and productivity. Yet, diet-related diseases remain a great public
health threat in the United States and globally.251 Local governments
have emerged as key innovators in nutrition promotion, adopting

247.
248.
249.
250.

See supra Sections III.C, III.D.
See supra Part IV.
See Trotter & Yerak, supra note 180.

NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., STRATEGIES TO LIMIT SUGARSWEETENED BEVERAGE CONSUMPTION IN YOUNG CHILDREN: PROCEEDINGS OF A
WORKSHOP—IN BRIEF 6 (2017), https://www.nap.edu/read/24897/chapter/1#6
[https://perma.cc/8SV4-MMCD].
251. See supra Part I.
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laws and policies that aim to increase healthier consumption patterns.
Regulation of the food and beverage industry and products often
comes into tension with the industry’s interest in maximizing profits
from sales of unhealthy products. Industry litigation, together with
lobbying, research funding, and public messaging campaigns, threaten
evidence-based public health measures, which aim to address the
obesity epidemic and reduce diet-related cardiovascular disease, type
2 diabetes, and cancer. The industry’s strategy to prevent or
undermine public health measures may also discourage adoption of
similar, or better, measures by other governments. The growing body
of litigation and jurisprudence relating to government interventions
to promote healthy diets, together with experience in tobacco control,
presents a wealth of knowledge for public health policy makers to
develop measures that are legally viable and politically sustainable.
With careful planning and design, local lawmakers can avoid or
overcome industry opposition and build on global momentum for
local health.

